Firm Exports and Multinational Activity Under Credit Constraints by Kalina Manova et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Pol Antràs, Doireann Fitzgerald, Fritz Foley, Linda Goldberg, Penny Goldberg, Nathan
Nunn, Katheryn Russ and Ana Maria Santacreu for insightful conversations, and seminar participants
at Stanford, Princeton, Columbia, London School of Economics, Paris School of Economics, Oxford,
Johns Hopkins SAIS, LMU Munich, New York Fed, Philadelphia Fed, 2010 NBER ITI spring meeting,
2010 NBER IFM spring meeting, 2010 AEA annual meeting, 2010 ERWIT meeting, 2010 UCSC
SCIIE conference, 2010 CEPR St. Gallen conference, 2010 Beijing UIBE conference, and 2011 GEP-ifo
Nottingham conference for their comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Kalina Manova, Shang-Jin Wei, and Zhiwei Zhang. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Firm Exports and Multinational Activity Under Credit Constraints
Kalina Manova, Shang-Jin Wei, and Zhiwei Zhang




This paper provides firm-level evidence that credit constraints restrict international trade flows and
affect the pattern of foreign direct investment. Using detailed data from China, we show that foreign-owned
affiliates and joint ventures have better export performance than private domestic firms, and that this
advantage is systematically greater in sectors at higher levels of financial vulnerability measured in
a variety of ways. These patterns are manifest in firms' export sales, export product scope and number
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indicates that limited credit availability hinders firms' trade flows, and is consistent with foreign affiliates
being less constrained because they can access additional funding from their parent company. Our
results further imply that financial frictions and host-country financial institutions affect the sectoral
and spatial composition of MNC activity. More broadly, our findings suggest that FDI can compensate
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1    Introduction 
A growing body of work has established that weak financial institutions severely impede countries' 
international trade activity and distort the sectoral composition of their export flows. At the same time, it 
has been presumed that foreign direct and portfolio investments can partially offset the detrimental 
consequences of local financial underdevelopment. However, direct firm-level evidence on the effect of 
credit constraints on export performance and the potential mitigating role of cross-border capital exchange 
has been limited and elusive. Moreover, the finance and trade literature has evolved largely independently 
of that on the optimal production and organizational decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs).  
This paper fills this void by providing an integrated analysis of the role that financial frictions play 
in restricting firms’ export participation and shaping the pattern of foreign direct investment. Using detailed 
customs data from China, we show that foreign-owned affiliates and joint ventures have better export 
performance than private domestic firms, and that this advantage is systematically greater in sectors at 
higher levels of financial vulnerability measured in a variety of ways. This evidence indicates that limited 
credit availability hinders firms' trade flows, and is consistent with foreign affiliates being less constrained 
because they can access additional funding from their parent company.
1 Our results further imply that 
financial frictions and host-country financial institutions affect the sectoral and spatial composition of 
MNC activity. More broadly, our findings suggest that FDI can compensate for domestic financial market 
imperfections and alleviate their impact on aggregate growth, trade and private sector development. 
Our analysis exploits detailed customs data on the universe of Chinese firms that engaged in 
international trade in 2005. These data report the value of all firm-level shipments by product and 
destination country for the universe of trade transactions, which makes it possible to examine the effect of 
credit conditions on all margins of firms’ export participation. We find that financial frictions limit 
exporters’ product scope, number of trade partners, and volume of cross-border flows within each product-
destination market. Foreign ownership, however, mitigates these distortions and allows firms to expand 
exports along all of these margins. These results indicate that firms face binding credit constraints in the 
financing of both fixed and variable trade costs, since the former affect market entry decisions while the 
latter influence the scale of foreign sales. This in turn has implications for the response of constrained 
exporters to trade reforms, exchange rate movements, and other cost or demand shocks. The evidence for 
firms' extensive margin of trade also indirectly corroborates priors that companies have to incur market-
specific fixed costs of entry, and implies that financial frictions hamper cross-border activity 
disproportionately more than domestic operations. 
                                                 
1 See Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) for evidence that MNCs employ internal capital markets opportunistically to 
overcome imperfections in external capital markets. The affiliates of US MNCs abroad use less external financing in 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets, but compensate with greater borrowing from the parent company. 
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We perform a series of sensitivity analyses to verify that our results are not driven by firm 
attributes correlated with ownership status or by sector characteristics correlated with financial 
vulnerability. The patterns we document are robust to controlling for sectors’ technological sophistication, 
contract intensity, and physical and human capital intensity, which can affect the sectoral composition of 
MNC activity for reasons other than financial considerations. Since bigger Chinese firms might enjoy 
easier access to external capital, we further confirm that the role of foreign ownership in mitigating the 
effects of credit constraints on export performance is independent from that of firm size. Finally, we 
provide evidence that the advantage of joint ventures and MNC affiliates over private domestic firms in 
financially vulnerable industries is particularly strong when exporting is more costly. Specifically, we show 
that the relative performance of foreign-owned companies in such sectors is systematically better when the 
destination market is more distant or has higher entry costs. 
Our empirical approach circumvents concerns with reverse causality and omitted variable biases 
that have posed important challenges in the prior literature. First, our estimation allows for the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects. This controls for firm characteristics that affect export activity equally in all industries, 
such as productivity, managerial competence, quality of the labor force, total availability of external 
finance, or access to foreign distribution networks. Our results are thus identified purely from the variation 
in trade outcomes across sectors within multi-sector firms, and reflect the way in which firms allocate their 
limited financial resources across production and exports in different industries. 
Second, the interpretation of our findings does not rely on the assumption that firms’ ownership 
status is exogenous to their need for and access to outside finance. As discussed below, foreign 
headquarters might in fact optimally integrate Chinese producers when the latter are especially constrained. 
Our results are thus consistent with multinationals being more prevalent than arms-length outsourcing in 
sectors with substantial requirements for external capital and limited availability of collateralizable assets. 
Third, our findings cannot be attributed to MNCs choosing to integrate Chinese firms with superior 
export potential. While this could explain why foreign affiliates and joint ventures outperform domestic 
companies on average, it cannot rationalize the differential effect of foreign ownership on firm exports 
across sectors. Moreover, if MNC headquarters specifically target better Chinese firms in financially 
vulnerable industries, this would be consistent with the idea that MNCs do so precisely to exploit their 
comparative advantage in overcoming liquidity constraints.
2 
Understanding the role of financial frictions for firms’ export participation has important policy 
implications, particularly for countries at lower levels of development that rely on extensive cross-border 
trade for economic growth. Given the difficulties of reforming domestic financial institutions, as well as the 
                                                 
2 See Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) for evidence that less credit-constrained Czech firms self-select into becoming 
arms-length suppliers for MNCs. 
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potential technological spillovers from the presence of foreign multinationals, it is equally important to 
evaluate the benefits from encouraging foreign direct investment. The rapid decline in international trade 
during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has renewed interest in these questions, with recent studies 
affirming that credit tightening was an important channel through which the crisis distressed world trade.
3  
This paper makes three distinct contributions to the literature. First, it provides new evidence on the 
effects of financial frictions on international trade. The prior literature on this topic has shown theoretically 
and empirically that, in the presence of credit constraints, countries with more advanced financial markets 
and institutions have a comparative advantage in financially vulnerable sectors.
4 There is also growing 
micro-level evidence that credit market imperfections severely restrict firms’ export capacity. For example, 
using an indicator of firms’ credit worthiness, Muûls (2008) shows that liquidity-constrained firms in 
Belgium are less likely to become exporters and, conditional on trading, sell less, in fewer products, to 
fewer destinations. Similar results are reported by Berman and Héricourt (2008), who proxy firms’ liquidity 
needs with balance-sheet variables in a sample of 5,000 firms in 9 developing and emerging economies, 
and by Minetti and Zhu (2010), who use survey data on firms’ credit rationing in Italy. A challenge for 
these studies has been establishing a causal effect of credit conditions on firms’ export performance since 
the measures of financial constraints they use are endogenous to firms’ international trade decisions.
5 More 
recently, Amiti and Weinstein (2009) have explored exogenous shocks to firms’ availability of external 
finance, and shown that Japanese banks transmitted financial shocks to exporters during the systemic crises 
that plagued Japan in the 1990s. Similarly, Bricongne et al. (2010) have found that the exports of French 
firms in more external-finance dependent sectors were more adversely hit during the recent global crisis. 
Our results validate these findings in the prior literature using a new source of identification: 
Instead of analyzing firms’ access to external capital through local banking institutions, we examine the 
role of foreign direct and portfolio investments. In particular, we exploit the systematic variation in export 
patterns across firms of different organizational structures and across sectors at different levels of financial 
vulnerability to establish a causal effect of credit constraints on different margins of firms’ trade flows. 
The second and primary contribution of this paper is to the literature on the determinants of MNC 
activity. Our work is most closely related to recent research linking the operations of foreign multinationals 
to financial frictions and firms’ export performance. These papers specifically emphasize that the 
                                                 
3 See Chor and Manova (2009) and Freund and Klapper (2009) on the current crisis, and Iacovone and Zavacka 
(2009) and Amiti and Weinstein (2009) on past financial crisis episodes. 
4 See Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005), Becker and Greenberg (2007), Chaney (2005), 
Manova (2008b) and Ju and Wei (2005, 2008 and 2010) for theoretical models; and Beck (2002, 2003), Becker and 
Greenberg (2007), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), Hur et al. (2006) and Manova (2008b) for empirical evidence. 
5 See also Greenaway et al. (2007) who find that the financial health of UK firms improves after they start exporting, 
although at the time of entry into exporting, future exporters do not appear financially healthier than firms serving 
only the domestic market. 
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subsidiaries of multinational companies can access internal capital markets to overcome liquidity 
constraints. For instance, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) show that the affiliates of US multinationals 
abroad respond faster and more effectively to profitable export opportunities than domestic firms. 
Following large real exchange rate devaluations, affiliates receive more financing from their parent 
company which allows them to increase sales, assets and investment, while local producers contract or do 
not expand. Unfortunately, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) are not able to directly examine the 
consequences of these effects for firms' exports. 
More recently, Antràs, Desai and Foley (2009) propose a model which endogenizes the production 
location and integration decisions of multinational firms in the presence of credit constraints, relationship 
specific investments and contractual imperfections. In their framework, MNCs are more likely to integrate 
their foreign suppliers in financially less developed countries in order to incentivize local investors to 
finance these suppliers. Parent companies are also likely to partly fund their affiliates’ operations. Using 
data on the activities of US multinationals abroad, Antràs, Desai and Foley (2009) find support for these 
predictions.
6 They do not, however, examine foreign affiliate exports, how they compare to those of 
domestic firms, or how they vary across sectors. 
Our results are consistent with the implications of these papers that multinational firms have a 
comparative advantage and are hence more active in financially vulnerable sectors relative to domestic 
firms. Our contribution is thus in providing direct evidence on the extent to which credit constraints affect 
the sectoral composition of MNC activity. 
Since we examine the export performance of foreign affiliates based in China, we implicitly study 
the behavior of foreign companies pursuing vertical or export-platform FDI. On the other hand, Buch et al. 
(2009) consider a model of horizontal FDI and present empirical evidence that credit conditions matter for 
firm’s choice between directly exporting to a market and setting up a local affiliate there. In a richer 
framework that incorporates multinationals’ complex global production strategies, Chor, Foley and Manova 
(2007) demonstrate theoretically and empirically that host country financial development increases the 
share of affiliate production meant for re-exporting back to the parent and to third-country destinations (i.e. 
vertical and export-platform FDI) relative to sales in the local market (i.e. horizontal FDI).
7 
                                                 
6 See also Bustos (2007), who shows that Argentinian firms in sectors with greater requirements for external finance 
are more likely to be foreign-owned and funded by their parent company. Huang et al. (2008), Héricourt and Poncet 
(2009) and Girma and Gorg (2009) argue that FDI helps private domestic firms in China overcome credit constraints 
and improve innovation activities. 
7 See Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Markusen and Venables (2000) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) for 
classical models of horizontal FDI, in which firms locate production in a foreign market when it is cheaper to service 
it that way instead of direct exporting. See Helpman (1984) and Yeaple (2003) for models of vertical FDI, in which 
firms move parts of the production process abroad to exploit cross-country differences in factor prices. 
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Finally, the third main contribution of this paper is to the broader literature on the role of 
international financial integration in promoting growth, trade, investment and entrepreneurship in host 
countries. For example, Ju and Wei (2010) show theoretically that financial openness can generate two-way 
capital flows, whereby developing economies with poor financial institutions can simultaneously import 
FDI and export financial capital. While the FDI inflow can help to realize a country’s relatively high 
marginal product of physical capital, the financial capital outflow can raise the financial return on 
household savings. These two-way capital flows may thus partially offset the effects of weak domestic 
financial systems. Consistent with this, Harrison, McMillan and Love (2004) find that foreign capital 
inflows are associated with a reduction in domestic firms’ financing constraints in a cross-country panel. 
Using firm-level data from emerging markets during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, Tong and Wei 
(2010) further show that manufacturing firms tended to face relatively milder liquidity shocks in economies 
that relied more on FDI before the crisis. In comparison, liquidity shocks were more severe in countries that 
had higher pre-crisis levels of international bank borrowing. Finally, prior evidence also suggests that the 
beneficial growth effects of FDI may be stronger in nations with better developed financial markets 
because of their greater absorptive capacity and ability to allocate resources.
8  
With regards specifically to international trade, Manova (2008a) shows that equity market 
liberalizations increase countries’ exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors. 
Moreover, these effects are stronger in economies with less developed stock markets prior to reform. In this 
context, our findings indicate that not only foreign equity flows, but also foreign direct investment can 
lessen the detrimental effects of financial underdevelopment on countries’ trade performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides theoretical 
background for our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 presents our results. 
The last section concludes. 
2    Motivation and Theoretical Background 
2.1    Why exporters require external finance 
Domestic producers and exporters routinely rely on external capital because they have to incur substantial 
upfront costs that cannot be financed out of retained earnings or internal cash flows from operations. These 
costs may be sunk, in the sense that they need to be paid only once upon entry into an industry, market or 
product line, or recurrent per-period costs. Most upfront outlays are fixed in nature and, once met, have no 
bearing on firms’ scale of operations, such as expenditures on R&D and product development, marketing 
research, advertising, and investment in fixed capital equipment. In addition, some variable expenses such 
                                                 
8 See for example Alfaro and Charleton (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2009). 
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as intermediate input purchases, advance payments to salaried workers, and land or equipment rental fees 
are also typically sustained before production and sales take place. 
Production for foreign markets is even more dependent on external financing than manufacturing 
for the home country for three reasons. First, exporting is associated with additional upfront expenditures. 
Sunk and fixed costs of international trade include learning about the profitability of potential export 
markets; making market-specific investments in capacity, product customization and regulatory 
compliance; and setting up and maintaining foreign distribution networks. Variable trade costs comprise 
mainly shipping, duties and freight insurance. As with production, most of these expenses have to be 
incurred before export revenues are realized. Second, cross-border shipping and delivery typically take 60 
days longer to complete than domestic orders, which further aggravates exporters’ working capital needs 
relative to those of domestic producers. Finally, the greater risk inherent in transnational operations 
requires exporters to obtain trade insurance. For these reasons, a very active market operates for the 
financing and insurance of international transactions, reported to be worth about $10-$12 trillion in 2008. 
Up to 90% of world trade has been estimated to rely on some form of trade finance.
9 
While access to external finance is important in all industries, some sectors depend considerably 
more on the financial system. This variation will be an important source of identification in our empirical 
analysis. The literature has identified two important determinants of sectors’ financial vulnerability that are 
technologically determined, exogenous from the perspective of individual firms, and innate to the 
manufacturing process in an industry. First, firms in some sectors have substantially greater liquidity needs 
because they face higher upfront costs and thus require more outside capital (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In 
our empirical analysis, we will employ three commonly used proxies for sectors’ liquidity needs: external 
finance dependence, R&D intensity, and the ratio of inventories to sales. Second, industries differ in their 
endowment of tangible assets that can be pledged as collateral (Braun 2003, Claessens and Laeven 2003). 
As is standard in the literature, we will measure sectors’ asset tangibility with the share of plant, property 
and equipment in total book value assets. 
2.2    Theoretical framework 
The literature has offered a number of theoretical models to rationalize the consequences of financial 
market imperfections for international trade. An important implication of these models is that the effect of 
credit constraints varies across countries and sectors, such that financially developed economies have a 
comparative advantage in financially vulnerable industries.
10 Here we outline a simplified framework that 
                                                 
9 See Auboin (2009). 
10 By modeling financial frictions à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) rather than the more traditional credit rationing, 
Ju and Wei (2008) demonstrate that the quality of a country’s financial system is not a source of comparative 
advantage beyond a certain threshold, in the sense that further financial development would not alter the structure of 
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ignores the country dimension, which we use to guide the empirical analysis of the variation in Chinese 
firms’ export performance across sectors. We first summarize the predictions of a model that incorporates 
financial frictions in a heterogeneous-firm world à la Melitz (2003).
11 We then use it to infer the 
differential effects of credit constraints on domestic firms and MNC affiliates. 
Assume that exporters require external capital, which they can raise in the financial market by 
pledging collateral. Contracts between firms and investors are enforced with a certain probability, which in 
a world with multiple economies depends on the country’s strength of financial institutions. When a 
financial contract is honored, the borrower repays the investor; otherwise, the firm defaults and the creditor 
claims the collateral. Industries, however, differ in their reliance on outside finance and in their availability 
of tangible assets, as described above. 
In the absence of liquidity constraints, all firms with productivity above a certain cut-off level 
would become exporters, as in Melitz (2003). Financial frictions, however, interact with firm heterogeneity 
and reinforce the selection of only the most productive firms into exporting: Because more efficient 
companies earn bigger revenues, they can offer creditors a higher return in case of repayment, and are thus 
more likely to secure the necessary outside capital. Importantly, the exporting cut-off varies systematically 
across sectors, and is higher in financially more vulnerable industries. In particular, entrepreneurs would 
find it more difficult to begin exporting when they need to obtain more trade financing or when potential 
investors expect a lower return in case of default. Credit constraints can thus preclude potentially profitable 
firms from engaging in international trade and result in inefficiently low aggregate trade flows. 
When companies require outside funds only for their fixed costs of production and cross-border 
trade, credit conditions would affect the selection of firms into exporting but not the level of their sales 
abroad. On the other hand, when firms face liquidity constraints in the financing of their variable costs as 
well, limited access to outside capital would also restrict their scale of operations. While the most 
productive (and least constrained) exporters could still export at first-best levels, less productive firms 
would only be able to do so if they ship lower volumes than would be optimal in the absence of financial 
frictions. Such firms can secure less outside credit than would be necessary to trade at first-best levels, and 
optimally use it to support lower export quantities which entail lower variable costs. The extent of this 
distortion would once again vary systematically across sectors. Specifically, firms would have to curtail 
their export volumes more if they are active in a financially vulnerable industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                
the country’s production and trade. In contrast, below this threshold, not only is the level of financial development a 
source of comparative advantage, but conventional factor endowments may stop being a source of comparative 
advantage, in the sense that an increase in the capital stock would not alter production and trade patterns. 
11 The discussion in this section is based on the model developed in Manova (2008b). Note that Manova (2008b) 
focuses on single-product firms only, but we also discuss an extension to the case of multi-product firms. 
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If exporters incur repeated fixed costs in every foreign market they enter, credit constraints can also 
affect the number of firms’ export destinations. In the absence of liquidity constraints, firms’ decision to 
sell in a particular country is independent of the decision to service other markets. By contrast, when firms 
have limited access to financing, they optimally add export destinations in decreasing order of profitability 
until they hit their budget constraint and exhaust their resources. This implies that, conditional on firm 
productivity, exporters in financially vulnerable sectors would transact with fewer trade partner countries. 
Credit constraints have similar implications for another dimension of exporters’ profile: the range 
of products they trade. The literature on multi-product firms has suggested that profitability varies across 
goods within a firm based on the efficiency level and consumer preferences specific to the firm-product 
pair.
12 With product-specific fixed export costs and limited access to external capital, firms must rationalize 
their product scope. While the number of goods a firm ships might vary across destinations depending on 
importer characteristics, exporters would offer a narrower set of products overall and sell fewer goods to 
any given market when they face tighter credit conditions. Moreover, these effects would intensify in 
sectors with greater requirements for external capital and limited availability of collateralizable assets. 
The organizational structure of a firm can importantly affect its financing decisions and need for 
outside credit. Compared to private domestic companies, firms with partial or full foreign ownership are 
not restricted to borrowing externally, but can also tap deeper internal capital markets and obtain funds 
from their parent company. Therefore, foreign-owned firms should have an advantage over domestic 
companies in overcoming binding credit constraints, which would be manifest in all dimensions of firms’ 
export activity: sales, number of trade partners, and product scope. In addition, this advantage should be 
greater in sectors characterized by particularly high liquidity needs and limited tangible assets.
13 
Foreign headquarters might plausibly have greater monitoring rights or managerial control over 
affiliate activities, and the allocation of financial resources in particular, at higher levels of foreign 
ownership. If so, headquarters would arguably be willing to extend more financing to wholy-owned parties 
relative to partially-controlled entities. This suggests that the integrated affiliates of multinational 
corporations should outperform private domestic firms in financially vulnerable sectors relatively more 
than joint ventures.  
The discussion so far has assumed that firms’ productivity level is fixed and predetermined by an 
exogenous productivity draw. However, companies might be able to improve their efficiency by investing 
in superior production technologies. This would typically entail substantial fixed upfront costs. Firms might 
also choose to upgrade product quality by employing more expensive inputs of higher quality, better skilled 
                                                 
12 See for example Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009). 
13 This discussion does not consider MNCs’ incentives to set up an affiliate abroad. We return to this issue and 
specifically address the potential endogeneity of foreign ownership in Section 4.2. 
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workers, or novel production processes. Credit constraints, however, could curb such investments in 
productivity and quality, with more severe distortions in financially vulnerable sectors. Moreover, two 
otherwise identical firms might have different export outcomes if one of them is foreign owned and thus 
able to upgrade its productivity or output quality. This suggests that in addition to curtailing production 
capacity for given export potential, financial frictions can also directly limit firms' export potential through 
these two additional mechanisms, since export revenues, number of trade partners and product scope would 
increase with production efficiency and product quality. 
To summarize, we expect credit constraints to impede both the extensive margin (firm selection 
into exporting, firms’ number of export products and destinations) and the intensive margin (firm exports) 
of trade. These effects would be magnified in financially vulnerable sectors, but mitigated by foreign 
ownership. For convenience, we will abuse standard terminology and refer to these patterns as MNC 
affiliates having a comparative advantage in financially dependent industries relative to domestic firms. 
3    Data 
We use detailed customs data on the activity of all Chinese firms that participated in international trade 
over the 2003-2005 period.
14 These data have been collected by the Chinese Customs Office and cover the 
universe of trade transactions. They report the free-on-board value of firm exports (in US dollars) by 
product and trade partner for 231 destination countries and 6,908 different products in the 8-digit 
Harmonized System.
15 The dataset also provides information on the organizational structure of the firm, 
which makes it possible to distinguish between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private domestic firms 
(including collectively-owned firms), fully foreign-owned affiliates of multinational firms (MNCs), and 
joint ventures (with foreign ownership under 100%). While the data are available at a monthly frequency, 
we focus on annual exports in the most recent year in the panel, 2005. 
Some firms in China are pure export-import companies that do not engage in manufacturing and 
serve exclusively as intermediaries between domestic producers (buyers) and foreign buyers (suppliers). In 
this paper, we examine the operations of firms that both make and trade goods, and exclude wholesalers 
from our analysis. Since the customs data do not directly indicate these intermediaries, we use keywords in 
firms’ names to identify them.
16 
We are interested in the export decisions of profit-maximizing firms that operate in a financially 
constrained environment. Since the Chinese government exerts considerable control over the activities of 
                                                 
14 Manova and Zhang (2008) describe the data and present stylized facts about firm heterogeneity in Chinese trade. 
15 Product classification is consistent across countries at the 6-digit HS level. The number of distinct product codes in 
the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the United States. 
16 Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2010) use the same filter in order to identify intermediaries and analyze their role in 
Chinese trade. We drop 23,073 wholesalers which mediate a quarter of China’s trade by value. 
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state-owned enterprises, and the sectors in which they produce in particular, SOEs' participation in 
international trade is not necessarily governed by profit maximization. For this reason, we exclude SOEs 
from our analysis and focus instead on the operations of private domestic and foreign-owned companies. 
We employ four different measures of sectors’ financial vulnerability, which have been commonly 
used in the literature on the role of credit constraints for trade and growth.
17 These variables are meant to 
reflect technologically determined characteristics of each sector that are inherent to the nature of the 
manufacturing process and beyond the control of individual firms. First, while firms in all industries may 
face liquidity constraints, there are systematic differences across sectors in the relative importance of up-
front costs and the lag between the time when production expenses are incurred and the time when 
revenues are realized. We capture these differences with a measure of sectors’ external finance dependence 
(ExtFini), constructed as the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. For 
robustness, we also use the share of R&D spending in total sales (RDi), since research and development 
typically occur at the beginning of a production cycle before a good can be manufactured and successfully 
marketed. We further exploit the ratio of inventories to sales (Inventi), which proxies the duration of the 
manufacturing process and the working capital firms require in order to maintain inventories and meet 
demand. Note that while ExtFini and RDi reveal firms' long-term requirements for outside finance, Inventi 
indexes their liquidity needs in the short run. Second, sectors vary not only in firms’ reliance on external 
capital, but also in firms’ endowment of tangible assets that can serve as collateral. We thus also use a 
measure of asset tangibility (Tangi), defined as the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-
value assets. 
As is standard in the literature, our measures of sectors' financial vulnerability are constructed from 
data on all publicly traded U.S.-based companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files. This approach is 
motivated by a number of considerations. First, the United States have one of the most advanced and 
sophisticated financial systems, which makes it reasonable that the behavior of U.S. companies reflects 
firms’ optimal asset structure and use of external capital. Second, using the U.S. as the reference country 
eliminates the potential for the measure of sectors’ financial vulnerability to endogenously respond to 
countries’ level of financial development. In fact, if the most financially vulnerable industries in the U.S. 
use more internal financing and tangible assets in China because of the worse financial system there, our 
results would be biased downwards. Finally, what is required for identification in the empirical analysis is 
not that industries have the same tangibility and liquidity needs in the U.S. and China, but rather that the 
ranking of sectors remain relatively stable across countries. Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007), Rajan 
                                                 
17 These sector measures come from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007), and are constructed following the 
methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003). They are averaged over the 1980-1999 
period for the median U.S. firm in each sector, and appear very stable over time.  
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and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003), among others, argue that the measures of financial 
vulnerability capture a large technological component that is innate to a sector and therefore a good proxy 
for ranking industries in all countries. Consistent with this argument, the measures vary substantially more 
across sectors than across firms within a sector, and the hierarchy of sectors is quite stable over time. 
The four indicators of industries’ financial vulnerability are available for 29 sectors in the ISIC 3-
digit classification system. In our empirical analysis, we match Chinese HS 8-digit product codes to these 
ISIC 3-digit sector categories. 
3.1    A first glance at the data 
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, in Table 1 we document the distribution of Chinese trade 
flows across firms with different ownership structure. Two patterns in particular stand out. 
First, the lion’s share of Chinese trade is conducted by firms with partial or full foreign ownership. 
China’s total exports to the world amounted to $531.4 billion in 2005. Private domestic firms, however, 
were responsible for merely 13% of these flows. Joint ventures accounted for a quarter of all exports, while 
foreign affiliates sent more than half of China’s exports. These statistics speak volumes about the 
importance of multinational companies and foreign direct investment for China’s tremendous export 
success in the recent past. 
The second pattern that emerges from Table 1 is that foreign-owned firms capture a systematically 
bigger share of Chinese exports in industries at higher levels of financial vulnerability. When we group 
sectors into three bins by external finance dependence, we find that MNC affiliates channel 52% of exports 
in industries at medium and high values of ExtFini, compared to 41% in industries with low values of 
ExtFini. On the other hand, private domestic firms mediate almost twice as big a share of exports in sectors 
with limited need for outside finance, relative to sectors that rely more heavily on external capital. Finally, 
the contribution of joint ventures to China’s trade is more equally balanced across industries, and its 
distribution falls between that for fully foreign-owned and fully domestic firms. 
We observe even more extreme sorting behaviors when we group sectors according to our other 
two measures of liquidity constraints: R&D intensity and inventories to sales ratio. Foreign affiliates 
account for an impressive 60% of exports in sectors with high liquidity needs, compared to only 30% in 
sectors with limited liquidity needs. On the other hand, private domestic firms capture roughly 9% of trade 
flows in industries with high R&D intensity and inventories ratio, and 23% in industries with more severe 
liquidity constraints. As before, joint ventures contribute about the same share of Chinese exports in all 
sectors. Qualitatively and quantitatively similar patterns obtain when we distinguish between sectors with 
low, medium and high levels of asset tangibility, with a greater proportion of trade conducted by foreign 
firms in sectors with few collateralizable assets. 
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The evidence from these summary statistics anticipates the results from our econometric analysis in 
the next section. It is furthermore broadly consistent with a credit-constraints view of international trade 
and investment, whereby private domestic firms are relatively more credit constrained, and thus under-
represented in financially vulnerable sectors relative to foreign affiliates and joint ventures. This might 
arguably occur because private domestic firms can only borrow in the local financial market, while foreign 
ownership provides additional access to internal capital from the parent company.  
4    Empirical Results 
We begin the analysis by exploring the variation in export revenues across firms with different 
organizational structures and across sectors at different levels of financial vulnerability. We find results 
indicative of credit constraints restricting firms’ worldwide trade flows, and foreign ownership relaxing 
these constraints. We further establish that these patterns are not driven by confounding factors such as firm 
size or sector characteristics unrelated to financial vulnerability that might nevertheless affect MNC 
activity. We then examine the effects of financial frictions on the extensive and intensive margins of firms' 
exports, and decompose the impact on firms' intensive margin into that on unit prices and on export 
quantities. Finally, we show that our findings are particularly strong for sales to destinations associated 
with higher trade costs.  
4.1    Main specification 
Variation across firm types within sectors 
We first analyze the systematic variation in firms’ worldwide export revenues across sectors and firm 
o es h e wnership typ . To t at end, w  estimate the following specification: 
  log              ·          ·         ·          ·        ·          ·                     (1)         
Here           are the free-on-board export sales of firm f in industry i, pooled across all of f’s export 
destinations.     and      are binary indicator variables which take the value of 1 for joint ventures and 
fully foreign-owned multinational affiliates, respectively, and 0 otherwise.          measures sector i’s 
level of financial vulnerability, which in alternative regressions we proxy with i’s external finance 
dependence, R&D intensity, inventories-to-sales ratio or asset tangibility. Finally,    are industry fixed 
effects, and     is an error term. At this level of aggregation, we work with 209,329 observations covering 
88,005 companies and 29 sectors. Throughout the paper we report results using robust standard errors. 
The omitted category in this analysis is the set of private domestic firms. The main effects of the 
two dummies thus capture any differences in average export performance between firms of different 
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ownership type that are invariant across sectors. For example, joint ventures and MNC affiliates may have 
easier access to foreign distribution networks through their parent company, enjoy preferential tax 
treatment, be more productive, have better managerial practices, employ more skilled workers, or offer 
higher-quality products relative to domestic companies. If so, in any given industry, foreign firms may have 
superior export performance than local firms on average, and this advantage would be reflected in positive 
and significant point estimates for    and   . 
The industry fixed effects in this regression control for systematic differences in firm exports 
across sectors that do not depend on the organizational structure of the company. If China has a 
comparative advantage in a given industry such as textiles, for example, all textile producers may earn 
larger export revenues than manufacturers of electrical machinery, regardless of whether they are domestic 
or foreign owned. Similarly, within each firm active in multiple sectors, worldwide textile sales may 
exceed exports of electrical machines, irrespectively of the ownership status of the exporter. The industry 
dummies explicitly account for factor endowment and Ricardian determinants of China’s comparative 
advantage, as well as for sector-specific demand shocks that affect the sales of all firms. The   ’s also 
absorb the level effect of         . 
The main coefficients of interest in (1) are those on the two interaction terms. They are identified 
from the variation in export sales across firms of different ownership types within a given industry. If credit 
constraints indeed limit firm exports, we anticipate lower worldwide sales in more financially vulnerable 
sectors. However, the distortionary effect of financial frictions would be mitigated in foreign-owned firms 
if Chinese affiliates can obtain internal funding from the parent company in addition to any credit they raise 
in the local financial market. We thus expect that     0 , where the first inequality reflects the notion 
that fully integrated MNC affiliates may benefit from deeper internal capital markets relative to joint 
ventures. 
As column 1 in Table 2 shows, foreign-owned firms indeed earn systematically higher export 
revenues than private domestic firms, and this lead is more pronounced in sectors with greater requirements 
for external capital. Moreover, relative to Chinese-held companies, MNC affiliates exhibit an even greater 
comparative advantage in financially dependent sectors than joint ventures. Similar results obtain when we 
proxy the severity of firms’ liquidity constraints with sectors’ R&D intensity or inventories-to-sales ratio in 
columns 2 and 3. Foreign-owned firms also export disproportionately more in industries with few tangible 
assets relative to joint ventures, who in turn outperform local firms in those industries (column 4). Note 
that, as expected, the interactions of the ownership dummies with sectors’ asset tangibility enter with the 
opposite sign to the interactions with the three measures of sectors’ liquidity needs, since financially more 
vulnerable industries feature greater reliance on external finance and fewer hard assets that can serve as 
collateral. 
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Variation across sectors within firms 
The analysis so far has exploited the variation across firms of different ownership type within a given 
sector, as well as the variation across sectors within firms of a given ownership type. Note that among firms 
of a certain organizational structure, some firms may be active in one sector only, while others may 
produce and export in multiple industries. In our sample, about half of all firms indeed trade goods in more 
than one ISIC 3-digit sector. The estimated coefficients in Table 2 thus reflect systematic differences 
between the exports of the average MNC affiliate or joint venture in a given sector relative to the exports of 
the average private domestic firm in the same sector. These estimates therefore capture the combined effect 
of credit constraints on firm-level exports and on the selection of firms into exporting.  
We next decompose these effects and establish that financial frictions indeed constrain trade flows 
at the firm level. We do so by including firm fixed effects    in (1):   
  log                  ·          ·        ·          ·                                  (2) 
The   's subsume the main effects of the ownership dummies, and control for other firm characteristics 
that affect a company’s export performance equally in all sectors. These may include the firms’ managerial 
competence, production efficiency, the quality of its labor force, or its access to foreign distribution 
networks. Importantly, the   ’s also capture the firm’s total availability of external finance, be it from local 
banks or a foreign parent company. The coefficients on the interaction terms are thus identified purely from 
the variation in worldwide export revenues across sectors within multi-sector firms. They implicitly reflect 
the way in which firms choose to allocate their limited financial resources across production and exports in 
different industries. This approach also ensures that our results are not driven by some endogenous sorting 
of single-sector firms into industries and ownership types for reasons other than credit constraints. 
Table 3 confirms that credit constraints affect the sectoral composition of firms’ exports even in 
this stringent specification. Relative to domestic companies, foreign-owned firms earn a bigger share of 
their foreign revenues in financially vulnerable sectors that require more external finance, are more R&D 
intensive, have a higher inventories-to-sales ratio, and employ fewer tangible assets. These results are 
highly statistically and economically significant. The export advantage of firms with partial or full foreign 
ownership over domestic producers is 25% larger in sectors with high requirements for external capital 
relative to sectors with low dependence on outside finance. Moving from a sector with few assets that can 
serve as collateral to a sector with high asset tangibility increases the exports of domestic enterprises by 
fully 76% and 59% more than the exports of MNC affiliates and joint ventures, respectively.
18 
                                                 
18 These comparative statics are based on columns 1 and 4 in Table 3. For these calculations, we compare sectors at 
the 25
th and 75
th percentile of the distribution of external finance dependence (asset tangibility) across sectors. 
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Note that the point estimates we obtain for   and   are on average 50% larger in magnitude than 
those in Table 2. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in Section 2 for the 
effect of financial frictions on firm-level exports and on firm selection into exporting: Since joint ventures 
and MNC affiliates are less credit constrained than private domestic firms, they effectively face a lower 
productivity cut-off for exporting, especially in financially vulnerable sectors. This implies that a foreign 
affiliate might be able to sell abroad when a domestic manufacturer of the same productivity level is 
rationed out of foreign trade. Because less productive firms export less, this effect tends to reduce the 
average trade volumes of foreign-owned firms relative to private companies in financially dependent 
industries. This selection mechanism can thus explain why the regressions that exclude firm fixed effects 
underestimate the impact of credit constraints on the level and sectoral composition of firms’ exports. 
As Table 3 illustrates, the advantage of MNC affiliates over private domestic firms in financially 
vulnerable sectors either significantly exceeds that of joint ventures or is not statistically different from it. 
In particular, strict monotonicity (    , significant at 1%) obtains when we consider sectors' R&D 
intensity or asset tangibility. By contrast, it does not hold when we instead explore industries' external 
finance dependence or inventories-to-sales ratio. However, in those instances we cannot reject the 
equivalence of the two coefficients at standard levels of confidence (10%). The same is true of all 
robustness specifications we present below: Whenever we record significant coefficients, we either observe 
significantly higher point estimates for the interaction with the dummy for full foreign ownership than with 
the dummy for joint ventures, or cannot reject their equality at 10%.  
To summarize, our results strongly suggest that credit constraints restrict firms’ export activity but 
foreign ownership alleviates the effects of financial frictions. Our analysis thus serves two purposes. First, 
it corroborates the prior evidence in the literature on the detrimental consequences of financial market 
imperfections for international trade flows at the level of the firm. Second, our findings indicate that 
financial considerations are an important determinant of the sectoral composition of MNC activity abroad. 
4.2    Sensitivity analysis 
Endogeneity 
Our identification strategy has relied on exploiting the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors and 
the variation in organizational structure across firms. While the former is arguably exogenous from the 
perspective of individual firms, ownership status might be endogenous to sectors' financial characteristics. 
In practice, however, this endogeneity does not pose a problem for our interpretation and would in fact be 
consistent with and reinforce it. We build this argument in three steps. 
Consider first foreign acquisitions. Multinationals may intentionally choose to fully acquire or 
become part stake-holders in Chinese firms with greater export potential. While this could explain the 
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positive coefficient on the foreign ownership dummies, it cannot rationalize the differential effect of 
foreign ownership on firm exports across sectors. Moreover, if MNC headquarters specifically target better 
Chinese firms in financially vulnerable sectors, this would be consistent with the idea that MNCs do so 
precisely to exploit their comparative advantage in overcoming credit constraints. But the latter would only 
emerge if credit constraints indeed limit (local) firms’ export performance and affect FDI decisions. 
Second, in the presence of imperfect capital markets in a host country, multinationals may have an 
incentive to enter financially vulnerable industries if domestic firms find it more difficult to finance their 
operations and are thus underrepresented in such industries. For example, foreign affiliates might then face 
less competition in the local market for sector-specific inputs, as well as less competition from other 
Chinese producers in the local and export markets for final goods. Both of these forces would generate 
relatively higher profits for MNC affiliates in sectors intensive in external finance and intangible assets. 
This argument would apply to both foreign acquisitions and greenfield FDI, in which companies establish 
new production facilities in a foreign country. Once again, this mechanism would be based on financial 
considerations shaping the activities of multinational corporations as we argue. 
Finally, the property-rights view of the firm could provide yet another reason why MNCs' 
integration decisions may be endogenous to the presence of financial frictions. In particular, consider a 
foreign headquarters that would like to move the production of a customized input to China. If this input 
requires relationship-specific investments that cannot be funded internally, the Chinese supplier would find 
it more difficult to raise working capital if it is active in a financially vulnerable sector. To ensure 
production takes place, the foreign company could then vertically integrate the Chinese supplier so as to 
help finance its activities. This would be consistent with Antràs, Desai and Foley (2009), who find that 
foreign ownership can emerge endogenously to alleviate credit constraints faced by the (Chinese) producer. 
In their framework, MNC headquarters either directly fund the affiliate or monitor its operations so that 
host country banks would be willing to finance it. They focus on the variation in financial development 
across countries and show that foreign integration is more likely to occur when the supplier is located in an 
economy with weak financial markets. Naturally, their model could be reformulated to generate precisely 
the result that integration will be more prevalent in financially vulnerable sectors. 
As these arguments illustrate, the potential endogeneity of firms' organizational structure in our 
data would corroborate and be consistent with our conclusions that credit constraints restrict (local) firms' 
ability to engage in international trade and that foreign ownership mitigates this effect. In addition, the 
mechanisms we have considered here could generate incentives for full foreign control versus partial 
ownership in much the same way as the incentives to integrate versus to maintain an arms-length 
relationship. In turn, such endogeneity of the degree of foreign ownership would reinforce and be 
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congruent with our finding that MNC affiliates enjoy a greater advantage over domestic firms in financially 
vulnerable sectors relative to joint ventures. 
Financial vulnerability vs. other sector characteristics 
The large literature on foreign direct investment has identified a number of factors unrelated to financial 
frictions that affect companies’ incentives to move production abroad. This raises the possibility that our 
measures of sectors' financial vulnerability are correlated with other industry characteristics that in fact 
determine the sectoral composition of MNC activity. The imperfect correlation among the four sector 
proxies we use, however, makes this alternative unlikely as it would be difficult for an omitted variable to 
move closely with each of our sector indicators (see Appendix Table 2).
19 Nevertheless, to address this 
concern, we perform three robustness exercises and consistently find our results unchanged. 
We first account for the possibility that the production decisions of foreign multinationals respond 
to sectors' factor intensities. In the classical model of vertical FDI, for example, firms optimally splice the 
production chain across borders in order to exploit cross-country differences in factor prices.
20 This model, 
however, examines firms’ production location decisions, without determining the boundaries of the firm. In 
other words, a U.S. company might move the unskilled-labor intensive stages of its manufacturing process 
to China, but it could use either an integrated supplier or an unrelated input provider. Because our analysis 
distinguishes between domestic and foreign-owned firms as opposed to final-good and intermediate-good 
exporters, it is thus not obvious that the classical predictions of vertical FDI models can explain our results. 
Nevertheless, recent work on the joint location and integration decisions of MNCs does suggest that 
multinationals may be more active in capital intensive industries.
21 If sectors’ factor intensity is 
systematically correlated with our four measures of financial vulnerability, our results could be spurious. 
Panel A in Table 4 confirms that our findings are not driven by MNCs moving production to China 
to exploit factor-price differences across countries. We expand specification (2) to include the interaction of 
each of the two ownership dummies with sectors’ physical and human capital intensity. We find that joint 
ventures and foreign affiliates export systematically more than private domestic firms in industries that 
employ less physical capital and more skilled workers. However, these patterns are independent of the 
effect of credit constraints on firms’ exports and on the sectoral composition of MNC activity. The 
coefficient estimates for   and   remain qualitatively unchanged. 
                                                 
19 The joint tests we perform in Appendix Table 3 reflect this low correlation among the four measures of sectors' 
financial vulnerability: When we include the interactions of     and      with all four variables at the same time, we 
almost always obtain significant coefficients for each of the four indicators. 
20 See for example Helpman (1984) and Yeaple (2003).  
21 See Antràs (2003). 
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The prior literature has also suggested that sectors' technological sophistication and contract 
intensity can affect the activities of multinational companies. For example, Antràs (2003) has shown that 
vertical integration is more likely to occur than arms-length outsourcing in sectors intensive in R&D. If 
both headquarters and the foreign supplier have to incur relationship-specific investments, ownership and 
residual rights of control should optimally be given to the party whose input is more important to the joint 
operation. If headquarters are more essential in R&D intensive sectors, or if our sector measures are 
correlated with sectors' intensity of relationship-specific investments, our results could be picking up these 
mechanisms instead of the effects of credit constraints. 
Sectors' technological sophistication might affect MNCs' decisions for reasons unrelated to the 
property rights view of the firm as well. For example, foreign companies might have a greater incentive to 
maintain production within the boundaries of the firm if they are worried about the expropriation of 
intellectual property in environments with weak contract enforcement.
22 Alternatively, multinationals 
might have access to superior technologies and thus have a comparative advantage in R&D intensive 
sectors. The relationship between this explanation and the credit constraints mechanism we propose, 
however, is more nuanced, as firms may require sufficient access to financing in order to develop or use 
more sophisticated technologies. 
The results in the rest of Table 4 provide evidence that these alternative determinants of MNC 
activity appear independent from the role of financial frictions. In particular, our results for sectors' external 
finance dependence, inventories-to-sales ratio and asset tangibility are robust to explicitly controlling for 
the interactions of the foreign ownership dummies with R&D intensity (Panel B).
23 This is a very stringent 
test as high R&D expenditures reflect in part financial vulnerability and not just technological 
sophistication. Our findings also hold at comparable levels of economic and statistical significance when 
we control for the interactions of the ownership dummies with sectors' contract intensity in Panel C. For 
this specification, we measure sectors' contract intensity with the Nunn (2007) indicator of the importance 
of relationship-specific investments embodied in the inputs used by a sector.
24 As expected, we also find 
that foreign-owned affiliates indeed export relatively more than Chinese domestic firms in industries 
characterized by high contract intensity, whereas joint ventures are under-represented in such industries. 
                                                 
22 Javorcik and Wei (2009) show that concerns about weak intellectual property protection and corruption in a host 
country may both incentivize R&D-intensive foreign investors to e and once they invest, induce them to 
prefer a wholly foreign-owned structure over a joint venture. 
 invest l ss, 
23 The only coefficient that is less precisely estimated is that on the         ·      interaction. We attribute this to the 
high correlation between external finance dependence and R&D intensity (0.56) and the fact that these regressions 
exploit the variation in two sector variables across only 29 sectors. 
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24 In particular, we use the (value-weighted) fraction of inputs to a sector not sold on an organized exchange. 
Qualitatively similar results obtain when we instead measure contract intensity with the (value-weighted) fraction of 
inputs to a sector that are neither sold on an organized exchange nor listed in reference-price trade publications, with 
the exception of the results for asset tangibility which are then imprecisely estimated. With that measure, the 
interactions of both     and      with sectors' contract intensity enter positively and significantly.  
Foreign ownership vs. firm size 
Evidence in the finance literature indicates that smaller firms tend to be more credit constrained than larger 
companies.
25 Since partly or fully foreign owned firms in China might be bigger that private domestic 
exporters, our results could capture the role of firm size instead of the effect of foreign ownership per se. In 
particular, while the firm fixed effects in the regressions implicitly condition on firm size, it is possible that 
the interaction terms are driven by bigger firms having a comparative advantage in financially dependent 
sectors. Note that while this explanation would still be consistent with financial frictions restricting firms' 
export activity, it would imply that MNCs are less constrained because their size facilitates access to 
external finance and not because of their deeper internal capital markets. 
To address this concern, we would ideally have information on firms' total sales in all markets they 
service. The customs data we use, however, do not contain statistics about firms' local operations in China. 
As a proxy for firm size, we therefore take firms' total export revenues across all destinations and sectors. 
While imperfect, this measure is arguably appropriate given the strong correlation prior researchers have 
established between firm size and firm exports for a number of countries.
26 
As we report in Table 5, bigger exporters sell relatively more in industries with greater 
requirements for outside capital or with fewer access to collateralizable assets, which is consistent with the 
prior literature. However, we continue to observe systematically higher exports for joint ventures and MNC 
affiliates in financially vulnerable sectors even when we control for the interaction of firm size with sectors' 
financial vulnerability. Moreover, the point estimates of interest are little affected by this additional control. 
4.3    Intensive vs. extensive margin of firm exports 
We next explore the mechanism through which credit constraints hamper firms’ export performance by 
examining their effect on different margins of trade activity. As described in Section 2.2, frictions in the 
financing of variable trade costs would result in reduced trade volumes at the intensive margin, i.e. in the 
value of foreign sales firms earn in individual export markets. If exporters incur fixed upfront costs in each 
market they penetrate, limited access to outside capital would further restrict the number of markets firms 
enter, i.e. the extensive margin of firms’ cross-border activity. 
The detailed nature of the Chinese customs data allows us to define export markets very narrowly 
at either the destination-sector or the destination-product level. While we have so far distinguished between 
29 sectors in the ISIC-3 digit industry classification, we can further differentiate between 6,054 distinct 
products at the HS-8 digit level. This makes it possible to control for unobserved market characteristics 
with fixed effects so as to cleanly isolate the impact of credit constraints at the intensive margin of firms’ 
                                                 
25 See for example Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Beck et al. (2008), and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). 
26 See for example Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) for evidence for the US. 
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exports. We are also able to identify their consequences for different dimensions of firms’ extensive 
margin, such as the number of products shipped to a country or the total number of destination-product 
markets. This has the advantage that we do not have to take a stance on the specific level at which firms 
incur fixed entry costs or the potential synergies in market entry costs across destinations within a product 
or across products within a destination country.  
We first study the impact of financial frictions on firms’ bilateral shipments by sector. Our 
estimating equation becomes: 
                   ·          ·        ·          ·                                     (3)  log   
where            is the value of firm f’s exports to destination d in industry i. As before, we include 
industry fixed effects    to account for cross-sector differences in transportation costs, demand shocks and 
any other industry specific factors (including financial vulnerability) that affect all exporters. We also 
continue to incorporate firm fixed effects    to absorb differences across firms such as overall productivity, 
managerial talent, skill composition of the labor force, average product quality, or total availability of 
financial resources. Of note, we now also condition on country fixed effects    to control for the variation 
in trade costs, market size, consumer income, the bilateral exchange rate and any other characteristics of the 
destination market that influence firms’ export sales. This exhaustive set of fixed effects allows us to 
identify the coefficients on the interaction terms from the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors 
and across firms of different ownership types within individual destination markets, and from the variation 
across sectors and destinations within firms. At this level of disaggregation, we analyze 953,475 
observations spanning 88,004 companies, 231 importing countries and 29 sectors. 
As Panel A in Table 6 indicates, MNC affiliates and joint ventures have systematically higher 
bilateral exports in financially vulnerable industries relative to private domestic firms in such sectors. These 
results are highly statistically and economically significant, with point estimates comparable in magnitude 
to those for firms’ worldwide exports in Table 3. In unreported regressions, we have also confirmed that 
these findings are robust to controlling for firm size or allowing other sector characteristics to affect MNC 
activity as in the previous section. 
Very similar patterns obtain when we explore the full richness of the data, and define firms’ 
intensive margin of trade as bilateral exports by HS 8-digit product (Panel B). The estimating equation 
remains the same as (3), but the outcome variable is now measured at the firm-product-destination level 
instead of at the firm-sector-destination level. This allows us to explore the systematic variation in trade 
flows across 88,004 firms, 231 importing countries and 6,054 products, for a total sample of 1,824,950. 
We next explore the consequences of financial market imperfections for the extensive margin of 
firms’ exports. The granularity in the data allows us to define this margin in a number of different ways. At 
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the firm-sector level, we first document how financial considerations influence firms’ export product scope, 
number of export destinations, and total number of product-trade partner relationships. We use the 
following specifications to explore how these three extensive margins vary across firms of different 
organizational structure and across sectors at different levels of financial vulnerability: 
  log#                 ·          ·      ·          ·                        (4)                
  log#                ·          ·     ·          ·                          (5)                 
          ·          ·        ·          ·                                      (6)  log#      
  #           measures the number of HS-8 products that firm f exports to at least one market in 
industry i. #       gives the number of destination countries, to which firm f exports at least one product in 
sector i. Finally, #           represents the total number of product-importer trading relationships that 
firm f maintains in industry i. It is given by the sum of the number of bilaterally traded products to country 
d (#           ) across all destinations d, or #             ∑ #              . In all regressions, we 
include firm and sector fixed effects to identify the coefficients of interest from the variation within firms 
across sectors. 
The evidence in Table 7 strongly suggests that MNC affiliates and joint ventures offer a broader 
range of products to more countries in financially vulnerable sectors relative to private domestic firms. 
These results are robust to the choice of sector measure for the number of export destinations and number 
of product-trade partner relationships (Panels A and B), but somewhat mixed for firms’ overall product 
scope (Panel C). 
As a fourth indicator of firms' extensive margin, we finally study the number of products that firms 
export bilaterally in each sector. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to include destination 
fixed effects to control for unobserved importer characteristics which might determine firms’ optimal 
export product scope: 
  log#                    ·          ·        ·          ·                                 (7) 
We find that relative to private domestic firms, foreign affiliates and joint ventures export a broader range 
of products in financially vulnerable sectors to each of their destination markets even when we control for 
importer fixed effects (Table 8). These results are qualitatively and quantitatively significant when we 
compare sectors at different levels of R&D intensity, inventories ratio and asset tangibility, but are 
imprecisely estimated or small and of the wrong sign for the case of external capital dependence. 
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These findings indicate that credit constraints severely restrict firms’ ability to enter more markets, 
to widen their product scope, and to expand their trade volumes. The evidence also further corroborates the 
idea that foreign ownership is associated with access to deeper internal capital markets which can 
substantially alleviate the consequences of limited external capital availability. 
The analysis of firms' extensive and intensive margins of trade has three additional implications in 
the context of the model discussed in Section 2.2. First, our results are consistent with firms facing credit 
constraints in the financing of both fixed and variable costs of exporting. If financial frictions were binding 
only with respect to the fixed costs of international trade, they would hamper the extensive margin of firms’ 
exports but not export revenues. Conversely, if only the funding of variable costs were affected, firms 
would limit their trade volumes but not necessarily expansion along the extensive margin. 
Second, our findings indirectly confirm prior evidence in the literature that firms face repeated 
costs of exporting in each destination-product market they enter. If these fixed trade costs were instead 
market specific but invariant with product scope, or were constant at the product level regardless of the 
number of export destinations, credit constraints would have affected either only #       or #          , 
but not #           or #           . 
Finally, the results for firms' export product scope and trade-partner intensity imply that credit 
market imperfections distort trade flows above and beyond their effect on firms' domestic production. If 
cross-border sales were instead as sensitive to financial frictions as domestic activities, distortions to trade 
volumes would be proportional to distortions to total production but there would be no adjustments along 
the extensive margin of trade. Our findings are thus consistent with exporters being more reliant on external 
finance than domestic producers because they face additional upfront costs specific to international trade, 
have longer shipping times, and face greater transaction risks. 
4.4    Export prices vs. export quantities 
Recall that limited access to external capital can impede firms' export activity through different channels. 
Holding companies' potential profitability from foreign sales fixed, credit constraints can restrict firms' 
production capacity and preclude them from exporting at their full potential. In addition, financial frictions 
can reduce firms' export potential by curtailing productivity upgrading or improvements in product quality, 
because investments in superior technology, higher-quality inputs and more skilled workers are costly and 
frequently require outside finance. 
While we do not directly observe firms' production efficiency or product quality, we can 
nevertheless shed light on these different mechanisms by exploiting the information on the export 
quantities that firms ship and the export prices that they charge. In particular, our data report both the value 
and quantities that firms sell by product and destination, which makes is possible to construct unit prices. 
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We can therefore decompose the effects of credit constraints on firms' bilateral exports into two 
components, by re-estimating specification (3) with either bilateral export quantities or bilateral export 
prices by firm-product-destination triplet as the outcome variable. 
As reported in Table 9, we consistently find that joint ventures and foreign affiliates export greater 
volumes than private domestic firms in financially vulnerable sectors. This suggests that financial frictions 
likely operate in part by restricting firms' capacity to export at their full potential, i.e. by limiting their 
ability to obtain sufficient outside capital in order to export at first-best levels. The evidence for export 
prices, however, is less conclusive: While MNC affiliates set lower export prices in financially vulnerable 
sectors, joint ventures have higher unit values in such industries. On the one hand, if we interpret lower 
export prices as an indicator of more efficient production, the former result might imply that fully foreign-
owned entities use their additional access to capital to improve productivity, reduce marginal production 
costs, and thereby boost exports. On the other hand, if we interpret higher export prices as a signal of 
higher product quality, the latter result might suggest that joint ventures have superior export performance 
relative to domestic manufacturers because laxer credit constraints allow them to improve quality. When 
this entails the use of more expensive inputs, it would manifest in higher marginal costs and possibly higher 
prices.
27 It is also possible that both fully and partly foreign-owned companies simultaneously undertake 
more productivity enhancing investments and more quality upgrading than domestic producers, but these 
adjustments have different net effects on export prices for MNC affiliates and joint ventures. Given the 
ambiguity of our results and the likely variation in mark-ups across firms, we leave it to future work to 
definitely establish the mechanisms through which financial frictions distort firms' export activity. 
4.5    Trade costs across destinations 
The interpretation of our results rests on the assumption that credit constraints restrict cross-border trade 
flows because firms are unable to finance the costs associated with exporting. Evidence that foreign 
affiliates ship relatively more than domestic firms not only in financially vulnerable sectors in general, but 
specifically when they face high export costs, would therefore confirm this mechanism and provide further 
support for our interpretation. 
To establish this mechanism, we would ideally observe firms' actual trade costs in each product-
destination market they enter. In the absence of such systematic data, we use instead two destination-
specific proxies for the outlays associated with international transactions: bilateral distance from China, and 
an indicator for the costs of doing business in an economy. The former has commonly been used as a 
                                                 
27 See Verhoogen (2008) and Manova and Zhang (2010) among others for theory and evidence relating input and 
output prices to input and output quality. 
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measure of the transportation costs of trade, and comes from CEPII.
28 The latter, on the other hand, 
captures the (log) monetary cost of setting up a new business in a country, relative to the country's average 
income (GDP per capita), and is obtained from the Doing Business Report of the World Bank. It reflects 
the fixed costs of business transactions, and has been used as a proxy for export entry costs in the prior 
literature.
29 Virtually identical results obtain when we instead use the number of procedures or the number 
of days needed to establish a new business from the same database (available on request). 
Using these two measures of trade costs, we expand (3) to include three additional interaction 
terms: 
log              ·                  ·           ·                  ·          ·                  ·                        
         ·          ·            ·         ·          ·            ·                  (7)             
In this regression, the outcome variable is bilateral exports by firm and sector, log          . The main 
variables of interest are the triple interaction terms. In particular,   and   capture the extent to which the 
advantage of joint ventures and MNC affiliates in financially vulnerable sectors increases with export costs. 
We include firm, sector and destination fixed effects as before, as well as pair-wise interactions between 
the ownership dummies, sectors' financial vulnerability, and countries' trade costs. These additional 
controls allow the effects of trade costs on exports to vary with sectors’ financial dependence regardless of 
ownership type (  ) and with firms’ ownership type regardless of sector characteristics (   and   ). 
As expected, we find that in financially more vulnerable industries, foreign affiliates export more 
than domestic firms to destinations associated with higher trade costs. This result obtains consistently 
across the four sector measures of financial dependence. In unreported regressions we have also confirmed 
that these patterns are robust to controlling for firm size or sectors' factor, contract and R&D intensity.
30 
This very stringent test provides further corroborative evidence that financial frictions distort international 
trade flows and affect the sectoral composition of MNC activity. 
5    Conclusion 
This paper provides micro-level evidence on the harmful consequences of financial market 
imperfections for firms’ ability to engage in international trade. We show that credit constraints 
                                                 
28 The data on bilateral distance are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
29 See for example Manova (2008b) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). 
30 These robustness checks include interactions that allow firm size (sector controls) to enter equation (7) 
symmetrically with respect to foreign ownership (sectors' financial vulnerability). 
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severely restrict companies’ overall export sales, hamper their capacity to enter more destination 
markets, and limit the range of products they trade. 
We also demonstrate that MNC affiliates and joint ventures in China have superior export 
performance compared to private domestic firms, and that this advantage is systematically higher 
in sectors that require more external finance or have fewer collateralizable assets. These results are 
consistent with foreign affiliates accessing internal capital markets in order to overcome binding 
credit constraints, and thereby enjoying a comparative advantage in financially vulnerable 
industries. Our findings thus highlight the importance of credit conditions in determining the 
organizational and financing activities of multinational corporations.  
One broader implication of our results is that foreign direct investment can mitigate the 
detrimental effects of credit market frictions on growth, trade and private sector development in 
financially underdeveloped economies. On the other hand, the 2007-2009 global crisis has raised 
concerns about the spread of financial shocks across countries via the financing and production 
decisions of multinational companies. Whether MNC activity and foreign capital flows improve 
steady-state credit conditions in host countries at the expense of greater volatility and exposure to 
world crises constitutes a fruitful area for future research. 
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 Firm Type All Firms State-Owned Private Domestic Joint Ventures Foreign-Owned
Total Exports 531.36 9.8% 12.9% 26.3% 51.0%
Low 58.88 10.7% 21.1% 27.6% 40.6%
Medium 234.09 11.8% 12.0% 24.1% 52.1%
High 238.38 7.6% 11.6% 28.2% 52.6%
Low 156.18 18.1% 23.1% 28.4% 30.4%
High 375.18 6.3% 8.6% 25.4% 59.6%
Low 52.55 22.4% 21.2% 28.7% 27.6%
Medium 95.89 19.2% 25.2% 27.7% 27.9%
High 382.91 5.7% 8.6% 25.6% 60.0%
Low 384.20 5.7% 8.6% 25.6% 60.1%
Panel D. Classifying sectors by asset tangibility
Table 1. Distribution of Trade Flows across Firms and Sectors
This table examines the distribution of Chinese trade flows across firms with different organizational structure and across sectors
with different levels of financial vulnerability, in 2005. All sector measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat
data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations.
R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset
tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. The trade values in the first column are in
billion US Dollars. The percentage shares reported in each row sum to 1.
Panel A. Classifying sectors by external finance dependence
Panel B. Classifying sectors by R&D intensity
Panel C. Classifying sectors by inventories ratio
Medium 91.07 15.6% 25.8% 28.5% 30.1%
High 56.09 28.4% 20.8% 27.6% 23.2%Dependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture 0.525 0.343 -0.297 1.022
(28.12)*** (14.27)*** (-3.64)*** (20.04)***
Foreign owned 0.320 -0.025 -0.904 1.328
(21.17)*** (-1.24) (-13.04)*** (31.02)***
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.336 7.317 4.739 -1.866
(5.74)*** (8.77)*** (10.06)*** (-10.53)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.511 13.979 7.053 -3.773
(10.95)*** (21.43)*** (17.63)*** (-25.40)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.151 0.152 0.151 0.153
# observations 209,329 209,329 209,329 209,329
# firms 88,005 88,005 88,005 88,005
#  s e c t o r s 2 92 92 92 9
Sector F.E.
Table 2. Firm Exports by Sector
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector in 2005. Each column reports
results using a different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-
1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash
flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of
inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. All
regressions include a constant term and sector fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.Dependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.787 13.360 8.511 -3.110
(8.98)*** (8.95)*** (10.96)*** (-11.02)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.757 17.009 8.417 -3.988
(11.10)*** (15.96)*** (13.68)*** (-17.99)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526
# observations 209,317 209,317 209,317 209,317
# firms 88,004 88,004 88,004 88,004
#  s e c t o r s 2 92 92 92 9
Table 3. Firm Exports by Sector: Firm Fixed Effects
This table identifies the effect of credit constraints on (log) firm exports from the within-firm variation across 3-digit ISIC sectors
in 2005. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come from
KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital
expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The
inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total
book value assets. All regressions include a constant term, firm fixed effects and sector fixed effects, and employ robust
standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.Panel A. Controlling for sectors' physical and human capital intensity
Dependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.751 8.934 3.485 -0.065
(8.25)*** (5.32)*** (3.78)*** (-0.12)
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.680 13.220 2.992 -2.776
(9.49)*** (10.97)*** (4.00)*** (-6.66)***
Joint venture x K intensity -17.57 -15.93 -14.77 -17.40
(-14.76)*** (-12.94)*** (-10.65)*** (-8.03)***
Foreign owned x K intensity -17.97 -15.68 -15.63 -8.94
(-19.11)*** (-16.19)*** (-13.96)*** (-5.33)***
Joint venture x H intensity 1.69 1.51 1.84 2.01
(8.63)*** (7.07)*** (9.31)*** (9.77)***
Foreign owned x H intensity 1.75 1.32 1.92 1.69
Table 4. Robustness I: Other Sector Characteristics
This table tests the robustness of the effect of credit constraints on (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector in 2005 to
controlling for other sector characteristics. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial
vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance
dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of
R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net
plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. Physical (K) and human (H) capital intensity come form Braun (2003)
and are based on 1985-1995 U.S. data. Contract intensity reflects the importance of relationship-specific investments in the
production of inputs for a given sector, from Nunn (2007). All regressions include a constant term, firm fixed effects and sector
fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level.
Foreign owned x H intensity 1.75 1.32 1.92 1.69
(11.81)*** (8.20)*** (12.89)*** (10.93)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528
# observations 203,989 203,989 203,989 203,989
# firms 87,291 87,291 87,291 87,291
#  s e c t o r s 2 82 82 82 8
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.Panel B. Controlling for sectors' R&D intensity
Dependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector





Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.412 7.237 -2.614
(3.72)*** (9.11)*** (-9.02)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.050 6.497 -3.270
(0.55) (10.30)*** (-14.25)***
Joint venture x R&D intensity 9.205 10.466 10.128
(4.87)*** (6.85)*** (6.59)***
Foreign owned x R&D intensity 16.475 14.445 12.879
(11.66)*** (13.19)*** (11.65)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.526 0.527 0.527
Table 4. Robustness I: Other Sector Characteristics (cont.)
This table tests the robustness of the effect of credit constraints on (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector in 2005 to
controlling for other sector characteristics. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial
vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance
dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of
R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net
plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. Physical (K) and human (H) capital intensity come form Braun (2003)
and are based on 1985-1995 U.S. data. Contract intensity reflects the importance of relationship-specific investments in the
production of inputs for a given sector, from Nunn (2007). All regressions include a constant term, firm fixed effects and sector
fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level.
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.
q
# observations, # firms, # sectors
Panel C. Controlling for sectors' contract intensity
Dependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.788 14.236 8.558 -3.247
(9.00)*** (9.38)*** (11.01)*** (-11.40)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.747 16.845 8.389 -3.949
(10.95)*** (15.50)*** (13.63)*** (-17.70)***
Joint venture x Contract intensity -0.483 -1.009 -0.720 -0.962
(-1.75)* (-3.60)*** (-2.61)*** (-3.46)***
Foreign owned x Contract intensity 0.879 0.231 0.749 0.396
(3.96)*** (1.02) (3.37)*** (1.78)*
Controls:
R-squared 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526
# observations, # firms, # sectors 209,317 observations, 88,004 firms, 29 sectors
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.
209,317 observations, 88,004 firms, 29 sectorsDependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.690 10.604 6.670 -2.569
(7.91)*** (7.19)*** (8.63)*** (-9.18)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.692 14.903 7.259 -3.687
(10.23)*** (14.22)*** (11.93)*** (-16.82)***
Firm size x Financial vulnerability 0.188 4.136 3.316 -1.289
(11.15)*** (16.06)*** (21.84)*** (-23.98)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.526 0.527 0.528 0.529
# observations 209,317 209,317 209,317 209,317
# firms 88,004 88,004 88,004 88,004
#  s e c t o r s 2 92 92 92 9
Table 5. Robustness II: Foreign Ownership vs. Firm Size
This table tests the robustness of the effect of credit constraints on (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector in 2005 to
controlling for firm size. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These
measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the
share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in
total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and
equipment in total book value assets. Firm size is proxied by firms' (log) total worlwide exports. All regressions include a
constant term, firm fixed effects and sector fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.783 12.796 10.022 -3.150
(23.94)*** (22.70)*** (31.69)*** (-27.52)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.708 12.769 11.412 -4.207
(27.21)*** (30.01)*** (45.27)*** (-45.92)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.370 0.370 0.371 0.371
# observations 953,475 953,475 953,475 953,475
# firms, # destinations, # sectors
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.715 8.571 8.893 -2.732
(28 31)*** (20 40)*** (35 71)*** (-30 63)***
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
Panel B. Dep. variable: (log) firm exports by 8-digit HS product and destination
Table 6. The Intensive Margin of Trade: Firm Exports by Sector and Destination
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on the intensive margin of firm exports in 2005. The dependent variable is
(log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination in Panel A, and (log) firm exports by 8-digit HS product and destination
in Panel B. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come
from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital
expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The
inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total
book value assets. All regressions include a constant term, firm, destination and sector fixed effects, and employ robust
standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Dep. variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination
88,004 firms, 231 destinations, 29 sectors
(28.31)*** (20.40)*** (35.71)*** (-30.63)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.655 6.484 10.795 -3.653
(32.77)*** (20.55)*** (54.95)*** (-51.41)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.332 0.332 0.333 0.333
# observations 1,824,950 1,824,950 1,824,950 1,824,950
# firms, # destinations, # products 88,004 firms, 231 destinations, 6,054 products
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.161*** 3.750*** 0.966*** -0.473***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.050* 3.960*** 0.285 -0.523***
R-squared 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.178*** 3.581*** 1.002*** -0.408***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.096*** 3.002*** 0.213 -0.317***
R-squared 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569
Panel C. Dep variable: (log) firm # HS-8 products exported by 3-digit ISIC sector
Table 7. The Extensive Margin of Trade I: Firm # Products and # Destinations by Sector
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on the extensive margin of firm exports in 2005. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is the (log) number of destination-HS-8 product markets firms enter, by 3-digit ISIC sector. In Panel B, it is the (log)
number of destinations firms export to, by 3-digit ISIC sector. In Panel C, it is the (log) number of 8-digit HS products firms
export to at least one country, by 3-digit ISIC sector. Each column reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial
vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance
dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of
R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net
plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. All regressions include a constant term, firm fixed effects and sector
fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level.
Panel B. Dep variable: (log) firm # destinations by 3-digit ISIC sector
Panel A. Dep variable: (log) firm # destination-product pairs by 3-digit ISIC sector
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability -0.037* 1.087*** -0.445** -0.049
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability -0.089*** 2.076*** -0.737*** -0.120**
R-squared 0.597 0.597 0.597 0.597
Controls:
# observations, # firms, # sectors
Firm F.E., Sector F.E.
209,317 observations, 88,004 firms, 29 sectorsDependent variable: (log) firm # HS-8 products exported by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability -0.001 1.200 0.585 -0.299
(-0.21) (10.26)*** (9.39)*** (-13.14)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability -0.046 1.632 0.690 -0.459
(-8.10)*** (16.91)*** (13.29)*** (-23.70)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.352 0.353 0.352 0.353
# observations 953,475 953,475 953,475 953,475
# firms, # destinations, # sectors 88,004 firms, 231 destinations, 29 sectors
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
Table 8. The Extensive Margin of Trade II: Firm # Products by Sector and Destination
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on the extensive margin of firm exports in 2005. The dependent variable is
the (log) number of 8-digit HS products firms export by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination. Each column reports results using a
different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat
data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from
operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to
sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. All regressions include a
constant term, firm, destination and sector fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.262 2.977 5.262 -2.030
(10.28)*** (7.02)*** (22.17)*** (-23.30)***
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability 0.446 5.411 7.525 -2.867
(21.71)*** (16.44)*** (39.33)*** (-40.45)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.267 0.267 0.268 0.268
# observations 1,815,596 1,815,596 1,815,596 1,815,596
# firms, # destinations, # sectors
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0 067 1 448 0 236 0 098
Table 9. Export Prices vs. Export Quantities
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on the intensive margin of firm exports in 2005. The dependent variable is
(log) firm export quantity or (log) firm export unit price by 8-digit HS product and destination in Panel A and Panel B
respectively, after these variables have been demeaned by their product-specific average. Each column reports results using a
different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on 1980-1999 Compustat
data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from
operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of inventories to
sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. All regressions include a
constant term, firm, destination and sector fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Dep. variable: (log) firm export quantity by 8-digit HS product and destination
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
87,939 firms, 231 destinations, 29 sectors
Panel B. Dep. variable: (log) firm export price by 8-digit HS product and destination
Joint venture x Financial vulnerability 0.067 1.448 0.236 0.098
(4.75)*** (5.75)*** (1.91)* (2.27)**
Foreign owned x Financial vulnerability -0.128 -1.909 -1.239 0.430
(-11.61)*** (-10.15)*** (-12.85)*** (12.67)***
Controls:
R-squared 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.442
# observations 1,815,596 1,815,596 1,815,596 1,815,596
# firms, # destinations, # products
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
88,004 firms, 231 destinations, 6,054 productsDependent variable: (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination
Sector measure of financial vulnerability:
Ext Finance 
Dependence




Asset   
Tangibility
Joint venture x Distance 0.063*** 0.028*** -0.145*** 0.148***
Foreign owned x Distance 0.028*** -0.003 -0.209*** 0.137***
Distance x Financial vulnerability -0.071*** -2.616*** -1.176*** 0.274***
Joint x Distance x Fin vulnerability 0.088*** 1.441*** 1.144*** -0.359***
Foreign x Distance x Fin vulnerability 0.078*** 1.382*** 1.287*** -0.476***
Controls:
R-squared 0.370 0.370 0.371 0.371
# observations 952,463 952,463 952,463 952,463
# firms, # destinations, # sectors
Table 10. Trade Costs across Destinations
This table examines the effect of credit constraints on firm exports across destinations with different trade costs, in 2005. The
dependent variable is (log) firm exports by 3-digit ISIC sector and destination. Panel A studies destinations' (log) distance from
China. Panel B studies destinations' (log) cost of exporting, from the World Bank's Doing Business report. Each column
reports results using a different measure of sectors' financial vulnerability. These measures come from KLK and are based on
1980-1999 Compustat data for U.S. firms. External finance dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with
cash flows from operations. R&D intensity is the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. The inventories ratio is the ratio of
inventories to sales. Asset tangibility is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. All
regressions include a constant term, firm, sector and destination fixed effects, and employ robust standard errors. T-statistics
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Destination characteristic: (log) distance to China
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
88,001 firms, 210 destinations, 29 sectors
Joint venture x Cost -0.070*** -0.139*** -0.523*** 0.104***
Foreign owned x Cost -0.138*** -0.210*** -0.629*** 0.096***
Cost x Financial vulnerability -0.107*** -2.066*** -2.328*** 0.861***
Joint x Cost x Fin vulnerability 0.195*** 2.524*** 2.564*** -0.682***
Foreign x Cost x Fin vulnerability 0.174*** 2.726*** 2.787*** -0.899***
Controls:
R-squared 0.372 0.372 0.373 0.373
# observations 885,938 885,938 885,938 885,938
# firms, # destinations, # sectors
Firm F.E., Destination F.E., Sector F.E.
87,103 firms, 139 destinations, 29 sectors
Panel B. Destination characteristic: (log) cost of doing businessISIC Industry
Ext Fin 
Depend












311 Food products -0.15 0.01 0.10 0.37 0.06 0.81 0.56
313 Beverages 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.40 0.06 1.13 0.95
314 Tobacco -1.14 0.00 0.28 0.19 0.02 1.35 0.48
321 Textiles 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.31 0.07 0.69 0.82
322 Apparel -0.21 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.02 0.50 0.98
323 Leather products -0.95 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.69 0.85
324 Footwear -0.74 0.01 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.53 0.93
331 Wood products 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.74 0.67
332 Furniture -0.38 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.04 0.70 0.91
341 Paper products -0.35 0.01 0.13 0.42 0.13 1.14 0.89
342 Printing and publishing -0.42 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.93 1.00
352 Other chemical products -0.30 0.02 0.15 0.27 0.06 1.21 0.95
353 Petroleum refineries -0.02 0.00 0.07 0.62 0.20 1.66 0.76
354 Petroleum and coal products 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.46 0.07 1.15 0.89
355 Rubber products -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.99 0.92
356 Plastic products -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.38 0.09 0.83 0.98
361 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.41 0.02 0.17 0.28 0.05 0.80 0.95
362 Glass products 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.42 0.09 1.01 0.97
369 Non-metallic products -0.29 0.01 0.15 0.48 0.07 0.95 0.96
371 Iron and steel 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.44 0.10 1.25 0.82
372 Non-ferrous metals -0.12 0.01 0.16 0.32 0.10 1.10 0.46
381 Fabricated metal products -0.25 0.01 0.17 0.28 0.05 0.91 0.94
382 Mh i t lt il 00 4 00 2 02 0 02 2 00 6 11 2 09 7
Appendix Table 1. Industry Characteristics
This table lists all sector measures used in the empirical analysis, by 3-digit ISIC sector. The bottom two rows of the table report the mean and
standard deviation of these measures across the 29 sectors.
382 Machinery, except electrical -0.04 0.02 0.20 0.22 0.06 1.12 0.97
383 Electrical machinery 0.24 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.08 1.06 0.96
384 Transport equipment -0.08 0.02 0.18 0.23 0.07 1.32 0.98
385 Prof and scient equipment 0.72 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.05 1.23 0.98
390 Other manufactured products 0.28 0.02 0.20 0.18 0.04 0.76 0.86
3511 Industrial chemicals -0.19 0.03 0.14 0.43 0.12 1.41 0.88
3513 Synthetic resins 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.40 0.88
Average across Industries -0.1555 0.0176 0.1586 0.3117 0.0695 0.9995 0.8677
St Dev across Industries 0.3636 0.0192 0.0476 0.1220 0.0376 0.2771 0.1475
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Ext Fin Dependence 1.000
R&D Intensity 0.562 1.000
Inventories Ratio -0.321 0.205 1.000
Asset Tangibility 0.251 -0.278 -0.691 1.000
Physical K Intensity 0.324 -0.015 -0.588 0.808 1.000
Human K Intensity 0.190 0.170 -0.195 0.492 0.646 1.000
Contract Intensity 0.255 0.312 -0.056 -0.115 -0.112 -0.140 1.000



















(log) # products 
by firm and 
sector
(log) # products 
by firm, sector 
and destination
Joint venture x Ext Fin Dependence 0.694 0.702 0.762 0.046 0.083 -0.144 -0.061
(5.97)*** (16.20)*** (22.98)*** (1.00) (2.23)** (-4.90)*** (-6.44)***
Foreign owned x Ext Fin Dependence 0.405 0.641 0.895 -0.177 -0.034 -0.322 -0.171
(4.27)*** (17.92)*** (33.06)*** (-4.90)*** (-1.17) (-13.43)*** (-21.37)***
Joint venture x R&D Intensity 2.072 1.975 -1.602 2.892 2.343 2.802 1.628
(1.02) (2.59)*** (-2.85)*** (3.66)*** (3.69)*** (5.37)*** (9.67)***
Foreign owned x R&D Intensity 8.306 1.441 -6.138 5.599 3.238 5.741 3.052
(5.42)*** (2.41)** (-14.05)*** (9.55)*** (7.02)*** (14.06)*** (21.90)***
Joint venture x Inventories Ratio 3.906 6.864 6.395 -0.076 0.202 -0.945 -0.050
(3.95)*** (14.85)*** (17.16)*** (-0.23) (0.71) (-4.35)*** (-0.59)
Foreign owned x Inventories Ratio 1.142 5.829 6.661 -1.223 -0.763 -1.558 -0.339
(1 44) (15 63)*** (22 24)*** (-4 68)*** (-3 50)*** (-8 85)*** (-4 94)***
Appendix Table 3. Joint Tests
This table performs joint tests for the effect of credit constraints on firm export activity in 2005, using all four industry measures of financial vulnerability in the same regression. Each
column reports results for a different outcome variable as described in the column heading. All regressions include a constant term, firm and sector fixed effects, and employ robust
standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
(1.44) (15.63)*** (22.24)*** (-4.68)*** (-3.50)*** (-8.85)*** (-4.94)***
Joint venture x Asset Tangibility -2.172 -1.351 -1.121 -0.356 -0.254 -0.121 -0.230
(-5.81)*** (-7.84)*** (-8.18)*** (-2.73)*** (-2.36)** (-1.41) (-7.17)***
Foreign owned x Asset Tangibility -3.266 -2.643 -2.186 -0.496 -0.320 -0.157 -0.374
(-10.89)*** (-18.81)*** (-19.50)*** (-4.87)*** (-3.85)*** (-2.23)** (-13.93)***
F i r m  F . E . YYYYYYY
S e c t o r  F . E . YYYYYYY
Destination F.E. -- Y Y -- -- -- Y
R-squared 0.527 0.373 0.334 0.538 0.569 0.598 0.353
# observations 209,317 953,475 1,824,950 209,317 209,317 209,317 953,475